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Abstract
There are dimensions along which men seem to be disadvantaged, on 
average, relative to women. For example, they can expect to live less years; 
in a growing number of countries they are, on average, less educated than 
women; they form an electoral minority; and their greater propensity to 
misbehave means that the overwhelming majority of the prison population 
is drawn from their ranks. These disadvantages, if they are real, all derive 
from an unchosen feature shared by one category of human beings: being 
a male. Does it follow that these advantages are unjust?
Keywords: gender equality, social justice, political power, criminality, 
philosophy
PREAMBLE
Part of my job consists in giving talks. Many of them leave hardly any trace 
in my memory, but some of them I shall remember forever. One of these 
is the short speech I agreed to give in Brussels on the 25th of April, 2013 
at the 2013 JUMP forum, a big annual event “for advancing women in the 
workplace.” What happened?
Over a year prior to the event, I had been asked by JUMP’s wonderfully 
dynamic director, my ex-student Isabella Lenarduzzi, whether I would 
agree to take part in a débat des philosophes on gender equality before an 
audience of hundreds of bright and active women. Despite my lacking any 
specific expertise on the subject, I accepted her kind invitation to open 
that debate, on the assumption that it would provide an opportunity for a 
common reflection on real and difficult issues, rather than for a rambling 
rehearsal of well-meaning platitudes. Given the time limit (ten minutes for 
the initial input), I asked whether I could be gently provocative. “Excellent,” 
Isabella said.
Because of unexpected technical difficulties, the debate had to take 
place without simultaneous translation, and hence in English rather than 
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in Dutch and French, as initially announced. For this reason, I probably 
skipped some qualifications. I did warn my audience that some of what I 
was going to say would be said ‘tongue-in-cheek’ but did not realize that 
this opaque metaphor meant nothing to many of them. Yet, as at least part 
of the audience laughed when I expected them to laugh, I felt confident 
that I was being understood.
I started realizing that something had gone wrong when booing joined 
the clapping after I f inished. This was soon confirmed by the f irst 
commentator: my speech, the man said, had been an insult to both 
women and philosophy. After several other reactions in a milder tone but a 
similar vein, I was given a couple of interrupted minutes to start clarifying 
what badly needed clarifying – obviously not enough to convince the lady 
in charge of the conclusion that, behind the appearance of some of the 
worst bullshit she had ever heard, something was hiding that even she 
might have found palatable.
The result, I confess, was some predictable frustration. Facing 
a disapproving, even indignant, audience is part of the price we have to 
accept paying occasionally for playing our role as academics – i.e., people 
whose fate is not dependent on their popularity and who therefore have the 
freedom and responsibility to say what they believe is right even if their 
audience does not like to hear it. But the source of my frustration, in this 
case, was different. The part of the audience I had unintentionally upset, I 
felt, was not indignant because of what I said and thought, but because of 
what they had some reason to believe I said and thought, though never said 
or thought. And the fault, I realized, was mine.
What follows is a written version of what I did say on that occasion, 
without any significant alteration in substance or form. However, after the 
introduction and each of the four puzzles I presented, I have added (in 
italics) a slightly longer comment. These comments are meant to spell out 
more clearly what my ten-minute speech tried to say. I conclude with a brief 
epilogue on the connection between the philosophical questions I wanted 
to raise and the struggle for greater gender justice.
1. BACKGROUND: MULTI-DIMENSIONAL  
INJUSTICE TOWARDS WOMEN 
I was invited to introduce a philosophical debate on equality between men 
and women. I want to do so in a way that befits a philosopher, that is, by 
questioning assumptions that are too easily taken for granted, by asking 
questions that may sound incongruous or that one would prefer not to ask 
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oneself. In particular, as I am addressing an audience with an overwhelming 
majority of women, I want to draw attention to four dimensions along which 
gender inequality does exist, but in women’s favor. I am not claiming that 
they are all of the same importance, nor that they can, without qualification, 
be regarded as dimensions of gender injustice. I am claiming even less that 
the disadvantages incurred by men along these four dimensions currently 
offset the disadvantages incurred by women along many others. 
 [These other dimensions do not only include those most commonly 
mentioned, such as the income gap on both an annual and hourly basis, the 
extent to which women and men occupy positions of political or economic power, 
or the extent to which men and women perpetrate violence on members of the 
other gender. They also include, for example, the fact that, on average, women 
(have to) spend more time and money on their external appearance, wear more 
uncomfortable shoes, cover or uncover parts of their body, or are de facto denied 
access to public spaces or means of public transport at certain times. 
This last aspect is of particular and growing importance, as highlighted, 
for example, by the conjunction of the motivation behind last year’s “Picnic 
the Streets” action on Brussels’ central lanes and of Sofie Peeters’ superb 
documentary “Femme de la rue.”1 Sustainability will require us to live more 
and more packed together in cities, with urban housing becoming ever more 
expensive and hence private space ever smaller. This makes the quality and 
safety of public spaces ever more important for the well-being of all, and 
freedom from threats and harassment in those places increasingly crucial for 
a fair distribution of access to such well-being between women and men.]
Nothing in what I am going to say amounts to belittling the importance 
of these various dimensions or to denying that the disadvantages incurred 
by women along these dimensions far exceed the advantages I am about to 
sketch. But I do want to question the view that the latter is true as a matter 
of necessity or that it will be true forever.
2. LIFE EXPECTANCY
Life expectancy at birth is currently 82.5 years for European women and 76 
for European men. One might be tempted to regard this as a minor advantage: 
an additional six years of life would be of greater value if they could be 
squeezed in at age 30 or 40 rather than added at age 80. But this is a 
1 “Picnic the Streets” is a movement that started with a massive unauthorized sit-in 
triggered by the opinion piece I published under that title in the Belgian press in May 2012 
and that led to the city’s decision to pedestrianize Brussels’ central lanes. “Femme de la rue” 
is a short film first broadcast in July 2012 that documented how women were being harassed 
in some streets of central Brussels.
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confusion. What hides behind the gap between the average lengths of 
women’s and men’s lives is a greater probability for a woman to reach and 
enjoy her forties, her fifties, her sixties, and so on, not only her nineties. 
One necessary consequence is that the gap between men’s and women’s 
incomes is smaller on a lifelong basis than on an annual basis: on average, 
men get a significantly higher income than women in every year they live, 
but they live less years. My point, however, is more fundamental. As regards 
inequalities in life, there is something that is presumably even more valuable 
than income: life itself.
[Perhaps a better way of conveying my point is as follows. Imagine a society 
in which one gender dies on average at age 50, the other at age 55, but the 
former has an average annual income 10% higher than the latter (with 
everyone guaranteed a decent minimum income). If this is all you know, 
which gender would you prefer to belong to? My guess is that many of us 
would go for the longer life. If instead, you would prefer to belong to the 
gender with the higher annual income, reiterate the thought experiment with 
a 5%, a 1% or even a 0.1% income gap, while leaving the respective life 
expectancies unchanged. I doubt that anyone would need to go to such a low 
income differential before indicating a preference for the gender with a longer 
life expectancy. As long as most people would be willing to give up some 
income in order to live longer, women’s higher life expectancy reduces the 
inequality between men and women.
This claim is not self-evident, as shown by two interesting objections. Firstly, 
whereas the socially produced income inequality between the two genders is an 
injustice, should we not say that the inequality in life expectancies is not, 
because it derives either from a biological difference or a difference in lifestyles 
(or a combination of both)? In the former case, it is a natural fact, not a social 
injustice. In the latter case, it is a matter of choice for which people need to be 
held responsible, not of social circumstances which social justice requires us, 
as far as possible, to neutralize. But are just institutions not also required to 
reduce natural inequalities, say, between the more talented and the less 
talented, between the able-bodied and the handicapped? And are gender-specific 
lifestyles not a matter of social norms at least as much as of individual choice?
Secondly, doesn’t the alleged advantage of women in terms of life expectancy 
overlook the inequality in the distribution of care work generated by this very 
advantage? Women do not only live five or six years longer than men, they are 
also on average two or three years younger than their male partner. This means 
that far more women than men are likely to still be around when their ageing 
partner is becoming frail and dependent. As long as much of the elderly care 
required in these circumstances is performed within the household, the 
necessary consequence is a very significant inequality in the amount of 
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domestic elderly care work performed by the two genders, which — as lives 
get longer and children fewer — may approximate or even exceed the size of 
the inequality in the respective amounts of domestic child care. Note that this 
holds even under the unrealistic assumption that both the will and capacity 
to care for their partner are the same for men and women. In this light, men’s 
lower life expectancy might be interpreted as a trick to extract more care work 
out of women. Its impact could only be neutralized if elderly care work were 
100% outsourced — which hardly seems desirable, even if it were affordable 
— or if women had male partners on average 5 or 6 years younger than them 
— which, for whatever reason, does not seem on the horizon.]
3. EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT
Ever since the invention of school, men have long enjoyed a huge educational 
advantage over women. In most, if not all, developed countries, this has ceased 
to be the case for some years. In the European Union, for example, the 
percentage of women with a higher education degree is 25%, compared to 
22% for men. And in Sweden, often regarded as the forerunner in matters of 
gender equality, the corresponding figures are 35% for women and 25% for 
men. Isn’t the concern to reduce this inequality overshooting?
[One may reply that some overshooting would do no harm. After centuries 
of massive inequality favoring men, a few decennia of some inequality 
favoring women would be welcome. However, even if today’s men were the 
descendants of yesterday’s men only and today’s women of yesterday’s women 
only, thereby forming two separate lineages, this sort of intergenerational 
revenge would have a hard time passing as justice between members of the 
current generation. If only because today’s men are just as much as today’s 
women the descendants of the female victims of yesterday’s injustice, I doubt 
anyone will, on reflection, take this objection seriously.
Far more serious is the objection that even though women are, on average, 
more highly educated than men, they still earn lower incomes. This would 
seem to make the injustice even worse: not only do women get paid less than 
men, but they do so despite studying harder. No doubt this paradoxical 
situation is due in part to the time it takes for differences in educational 
accomplishment to be reflected in differences in professional success, but also 
and probably to a larger extent to the fact that women choose studies that 
lead to less lucrative careers. If this is the main factor, can the paradox still be 
viewed as amplifying the injustice?
Whatever the verdict on the previous two issues, there is a third consideration 
worth pondering. Irrespective of its specific content, the level of education 
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matters for reasons irreducible to earning power: it has a significant impact 
on health, for example, or on empowerment as citizens and household members. 
This is arguably why it features as an important separate variable in indexes 
of a country’s human development proposed as alternatives to GDP per 
capita. If we accept this proposition, we seem led again to the same sort of trade-
off as in the case of life expectancy: women’s emerging educational advantage 
should then be regarded as offsetting (albeit in small part) men’s economic 
advantage. Or can this only be said if the educational advantage is due to a 
difference in innate ability rather than to a difference in effort?]
4. POLITICAL POWER
If you combine the first two inequalities, you are in a position to predict the 
growth of a third one. From women’s longer life expectancy, it necessarily 
follows, with universal suffrage, that they form a majority in the electorate. 
Moreover, in countries in which voting is not compulsory, there tends to be 
a significant statistical correlation between level of education and actually 
using the right to vote. Even in Belgium, where the vote is supposed to be 
obligatory, the less educated, I gather, are over represented in the growing 
percentage of non-voters. Consequently, the growing educational gap between 
women and men can be expected to express itself in a continuous strengthening 
of women’s electoral majority.2 If as a result of these trends women regularly cast 
over 60% of the votes, can it not be said that there is a political inequality in their 
favor, no doubt less outrageous as regards both size and source than the one 
that long prevailed in our so-called democratic past, but nonetheless real? 
Moreover, this inequality would hold even if the people elected into power by 
this predominantly female electorate kept being mostly men. On the 
assumption that the electorate is not stupid or blind, these people, whether 
women or men, will only be elected and re-elected if the policies they 
propose or adopt match the preferences of the female majority.
[Again, a simple thought experiment may make the point more vividly. 
Suppose you can choose between two electoral systems: one in which only 
women can vote and only men can be elected, and one in which only men 
can vote and only women can be elected. Which would you prefer? Isn’t it 
obvious that those concerned with the fate of all women, rather than the 
career prospects of a few, should prefer the former to the latter? If this is the 
case, shouldn’t the fact that women form a growing proportion of the voters 
(if it is a fact) count as a significant political inequality in their favor?
2 This must be asserted with some caution, as one would need to verify that, for any 
given level of education, men do not vote more than women and that the overall positive 
correlation between education and voting holds for both genders taken separately.
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Moreover, this inequality in electoral power is one which, if they so wished 
(and contrary to the institutional assumption in the thought experiment of 
the previous paragraph), women could convert into an even greater inequality 
in their favor among those who hold political responsibilities. This would 
be the case, for example, if our electoral system were organized so as to 
aggregate the votes of women and men in a way essentially analogous to 
the way in which Belgium’s electoral system aggregates the votes of Flemings 
and Walloons in Belgium’s federal elections or the votes of (supposedly) French 
and Dutch speakers in Brussels’s regional elections: women would be required 
to vote for women only and men for men only.3 The seats in Parliament would 
then be automatically distributed in proportion to the number of men and 
women in the electorate. If all the government needed were support of a 
majority in the Parliament (without a further institutional constraint 
analogous to the parity rules in the Belgian and Brussels governments), an 
all-female government supported by the female majority could rule the 
country in impeccably “democratic” fashion.
There are of course good reasons to avoid extending to the gender 
divide the electoral pathology of Belgium’s language community divide. It 
is important that those who want to govern a country should be electorally 
accountable to its whole population. But even with a strict analogue of 
Belgium’s current electoral system, and hence in the absence of a guaranteed 
proportional representation of men and women in the elected assemblies, 
it is within the power of the electoral (and even greater voting) majority of 
women to vote into office a corresponding majority of women. Indeed, under 
the French or British system of single-member constituencies, and on the 
reasonable assumption that women form the majority of the voting public 
in every one of them, women have the power to make sure that only women 
get into the parliamentary assembly. However, the point to which I want to 
draw attention holds irrespective of whether women use their power in 
this way. It holds even if they elected into office only male candidates, 
those ambitious enough to fancy exercising the increasingly unattractive 
job of politician, but driven by their very ambition to advocate and implement 
policies favored by the female majority.]
3 For its federal elections, Belgium has a list-proportional system with provincial 
constituencies. In Flemish provinces, there are only Flemish candidates. And in Walloon 
provinces, there are only Walloon candidates. For the regional elections in the officially 
bilingual Region of Brussels Capital, there are two electoral colleges, with only Dutch-speaking 
parties standing in one, and only French-speaking parties in the other. Brussels voters can 
choose in which of these two colleges they wish to vote and are assumed to do so according to 
their own native language — an increasingly problematic assumption in a region with hundreds 
of distinct native languages.
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5. HORMONAL INEQUALITY
The fourth inequality to which I want to draw attention is more delicate. 
Although part of what I am going to say will be said, as I hope you will 
notice, tongue-in-cheek, it is meant to draw attention to another important 
and difficult issue relating to the connection between gender injustice and 
gender inequality.
As a point of departure, take the rather unsurprising fact I recently heard 
that over 95% of the consumers of prostitution services are men. Why is this? 
This might have something to do with the fact that men’s annual incomes 
exceed women’s by a significant amount and that men therefore have more 
pocket money to spend on this expensive form of leisure. Though pretty 
ignorant on these matters, I suspect that the cause is more basic and has 
something to do with the difference between male and female libido, their 
respective hormonal endowments, or some other physiological difference. 
No doubt this difference can be said to generate some of the most despicable 
cases of domination of women by men (whether clients or pimps). But does 
it not also reflect a gender-based inequality of needs, i.e., a form of handicap? 
Men’s greedier libido turns them into handicapped individuals, sometimes 
even super-handicapped à la Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Whether the price 
to be paid for this handicap takes the form of expenditure on sexual services 
or of a fall into a reputational precipice, isn’t there here something to pity 
as well as to be indignant about? 
[Attributing the frequency of some form of misdemeanor to the fact that 
the perpetrators are men rather than women does not disculpate them: an 
explanation is not an excuse, let alone a justification. Most men, after all, are 
not prostitution clients, and however plausible the claim that the strong 
statistical correlation with maleness reflects a genuine causal link, the role 
played by free will in the causal process is by no means irrelevant. This is 
arguably one key reason why we believe that prostitution services should not 
be subsidized in the way we believe psychiatric services and other forms of 
medical care should be. All of this hardly needs saying, I thought, but some of 
the reactions to the rather abrupt punch line of my speech suggest that stating 
the (fairly) obvious is not always a waste of time.
There is, however, a deeper challenge here. Consider the fact that young 
men are massively over represented among perpetrators of violent crimes (partly 
against women, but to a large extent against other men), and hence (luckily) 
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also among prison inmates. Here again, the hormonal story is not implausible.4 
But the argument need not be fundamentally different if men and women 
had equally aggressive dispositions but men gave way to them more often 
simply because their genetic endowment makes them physically stronger. 
Under modern conditions, it is fortunately less easy to get away with violence 
than in the era of Genghis Khan. Has an advantage not thereby be turned into 
a disadvantage? Can it not be said that men are handicapped relative to 
women because of their greater propensity to end up in jail as a result of acts 
they would not have committed had they been women? Here again, it may 
be prudent to add that this is no excuse, nor justification, for their behavior. 
After all, there are men who have not spent one minute in prison any more 
than one cent on prostitution. 
However, think about the way we react to similar figures displaying strong 
correlations between social background and smoking, or between social 
background and criminality. People who grew up in poor families tend to 
smoke far more than people from rich families (which makes the tobacco tax 
one of the most regressive taxes ever implemented), and they are disproportionately 
in prision (in part, no doubt, but not only, because they tend to be sentenced 
more severely for the same crimes). Is it not plausible to regard this as an aspect 
of the injustice they suffer? They did not choose to be poor, and had they been 
rich rather than poor they would not (probabilistically speaking) be wasting 
their money on cigarettes or their time behind prison bars. This should not 
prevent us from taxing the smokers or punishing the offenders, but should it 
not temper our indignation – especially if we happen to enjoy a more 
privileged background? Indeed, should we not view such facts as one of the 
expressions of the injustice inflicted on the poor?
In this light, let us return to those men who waste their money on prostitutes 
or misbehave in a way that gets them into trouble (whether incarceration or 
reputational precipice). They did not choose to be men any more than those 
born poor chose to be born poor, and had they been women rather than men, 
they would not (probabilistically speaking) have to bear these burdens. Is the 
analogy between the two cases not so strong that it would be inconsistent to 
regard the inequalities mentioned as an aspect of an injustice suffered by the 
poor, but not as an injustice suffered by men? (Note that the analogy holds 
irrespective of the validity of the hormonal diagnosis. If the difference between 
the behavior patterns of men and women has nothing to do with testosterone 
or any other physiological difference, but rather with the way in which boys 
4 See Paula Casal’s striking piece, which helped inspire the formulation of this fourth 
puzzle: “Love not war. On the chemistry of good and evil,” in Arguing about Justice, Louvain-la-
Neuve: Presses universitaires de Louvain, 2011, 145-156. Freely downloadable at www.academia.
edu/2396206/Arguing_about_Justice_Essays_for_Philippe_Van_Parijs_PUL_2011_free_PDF
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are socialized – say, being encouraged to play with guns rather than dolls –, 
the analogy would arguably be even closer).
This brings us to my philosophical question. Why is it that my intuition – 
and presumably yours – is different in the two cases? Is it simply because of the 
contingent fact that these handicaps suffered by men can hardly be said to 
offset the many unjust inequalities that favor them, whereas in the case of the 
poor they are added to a whole series of other clearly unjust inequalities in the 
same direction? Or is there a deeper, less contingent difference between the 
two cases? Is the key difference, for example, that it is hardly controversial 
that a world without poverty would be a better world, whereas some doubt 
(perhaps wrongly) that a mankind without males would be a better mankind? 
If this is not the key difference, what is?]
EPILOGUE: A PHILOSOPHER’S JOB
As mentioned at the start, part of the job of a philosopher is to question 
assumptions, and one effective way of doing so is by formulating puzzles by 
asking, for example,
(1) If society gives group B more money per unit of time while nature gives 
group A more units of time, can it always be said that there is an unjust 
inequality at the expense of group A?
(2) If society gives group B more money and group A better education, can 
it always be said that there is an unjust inequality at the expense of group A?
(3) If group B enjoys a majority among power holders and group A a 
majority among those who choose the power holders, can it always be said 
that there is an unjust inequality at the expense of group A?
(4) If group B’s genetic endowment makes its members more likely to end 
up in prison, can this ever be counted as an injustice suffered by its members, 
none of whom chose not to be born a member of the less incarceration-prone 
group A?
Are these questions outlandish, far-fetched, deprived of any relevance to the 
most pressing issues and most urgent struggles for the sake of greater justice 
between men and women? At first sight, several of them certainly are. Yet they 
are worth asking. For each of them is meant to invite further thinking on the 
ideal of equality of opportunity that underlies much of the struggle for greater 
gender justice. The equalization of opportunities requires that one should 
neutralize the impact on our life prospects of circumstances beyond our control 
– including  our being born women or men –, while making us bear the 
consequences of the choices we make – including those made by virtue of 
preferences that may happen to differ markedly between women and men. 
 Four Puzzles on Gender Equality 89
LEAP 3 (2015)
Taking seriously the questions raised above and addressing the difficulties 
they reveal is essential to clarify, refine, and sharpen this ideal, and thereby to 
strengthen the struggles they inspire. Dismissing them, by contrast, deprives 
us of an opportunity to give a sounder basis to the struggle for greater justice 
along the gender dimension, as along any other. In particular, articulating 
the ideal in response to puzzling challenges is essential to put any particular 
struggle in a broader context: the concern for opportunities, the real freedom 
of those with least real freedom, irrespective of their gender, but among whom 
women are massively overrepresented.
